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EO 11652 GDS

TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, HA

SUBJECT: ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I

REF: (A) STATE 047671, (B) STATE 038356 AND PREVIOUS

PART I - POLICY ASSESSMENT

A. U.S. INTERESTS

IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. LONG-RANGE INTERESTS IN IMPROVING OUR PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH THE LDCS, MAKING A MORE EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS THROUGH AID AND TRADE, OVERCOMING GLOBAL FOOD SHORTAGES, REDUCING THE FLOW OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS, AMELIORATING HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS, AND CONTENDING WITH CUBA'S GROWING INFLUENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN, THE EMBASSY CONSIDERS THE FOLLOWING TO BE THE PRINCIPAL U.S. INTERESTS IN HAITI:

1. PROMOTING THE MORE EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF HAITI OVER THE LONG TERM WHILE ALLEVIATING ITS CURRENT POVERTY.

2. IMPROVING THE OBSERVANCE OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS WHILE ENCOURAGING ORDERLY AND CONTINUED POLITICAL CONFIDENTIAL

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PROGRESS.

3. PROMOTING A STABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE FOR HAITI IN THE CARIBBEAN.

B. OVERVIEW

1. HAITI PRESENTS A MORE COMPLICATED CHALLENGE TO OUR INTERESTS IN THE 1977-79 TIME FRAME THAN IT DID IN THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY AFTER FRANCOIS DUVALIER'S DEATH, WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL DONOR COMMUNITY UNDERTOOK A RESCUE OPERATION FOR THIS ECONOMICALLY PROSTRATED CARIBBEAN NATION, AND FOREIGN AID LEVELS MOUNTED DRAMATICALLY. NOW THAT A MEASURE OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY HAS BEEN ATTAINED, AND SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF A ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE ARE IN PLACE, I WOULD DEFINE THE CHALLENGE IN DIFFERENT TERMS: DEVISING A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY WHICH WILL ADDRESS MORE SYSTEMATICALLY THE PRESSING NEEDS OF THE RURAL MAJORITY, THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEVASTATION, AND BASIC INSTITUTIONAL/EDUCATIONAL WEAKNESSES. SUCH A STRATEGY WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION BETWEEN HAITI'S ENORMOUS DEVELOPMENTAL NEEDS AND HAITI'S ABILITY -- SUBJECT TO ONLY SLOW EXPANSION -- TO ABSORB ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. THE STRATEGY WOULD ALSO HAVE TO WEIGH RESURGENT HAITIAN RESENTMENT OVER EXCESSIVE FOREIGN CONTROL. IT SHOULD BE WORKED OUT AND IMPLEMENTED IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE OTHER INTERNATIONAL DONORS.

2. THE RISK FOR THE INTERNATIONAL DONORS IS THAT THEIR RESOURCES WILL BE WASTED AND THEIR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES FRUSTRATED FOR LACK OF A REALISTIC GOVERNMENT AWARENESS OF ITS LIMITATIONS AND A GREATER COMMITMENT TO RESPONSIBLE COLLABORATION. THE RISK FOR THE HAITIAN AUTHORITIES IS THAT THEY WILL BE SWAMPED BY PROJECTS AND INUNDATED BY HIGH-SALARIED FOREIGN EXPERTS PRESSING THEIR OBJECTIVES IN A MANNER DEEMED DISRESPECTFUL OF HAITIAN "REALITIES". A COMMON CONCEPTUAL AND MANAGERIAL FRAMEWORK WOULD

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SERVE THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES.

3. ACHIEVING A GREATER MEASURE OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHT HAS BECOME A MORE INTRICATE TASK IN THIS BACKWARD, TRADITIONALLY AUTHORITARIAN NATION. THE JEAN-CLAUDE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT, LESS PARANOID ABOUT INTERNAL OPPOSITION AND MORE ATTENTIVE TO THE STRONG U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENT, HAS ALREADY TAKEN CERTAIN OBVIOUS REFORMS, SUCH AS RELEASING A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF POLITICAL DETAINEES AND MANY COMMON LAW OFFENDERS. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT STILL DECLINES TO GIVE AN ACCOUNTING OF POLITICAL PRISONERS STILL INCARCERATED OR LONG SINCE DECEASED IN JAIL, PERMITS MEDIEVAL PRISON CONDITIONS, GRANTS THE SECURITY SERVICES SWEEPING POWERS TO COMBAT SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, AND PREFERS TO "HUNKER DOWN" AGAINST EXTERNAL CRITICISM RATHER THAN UNDERTAKE A FORTHRIGHT PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT. FURTHER PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS WILL INVOLVE US IN SENSITIVE OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS OF SEVERAL MINISTRIES, THE

ARMED FORCES, AND THE SECURITY SERVICES, WHERE ADMINISTRATIVE IMMOBILITY AND RESENTMENT OF U.S. "PATERNALISM" LIMIT OUR LEVERAGE.

4. A FURTHER COMPLICATION: PRESIDENT CARTER'S COMMITMENT TO "LESSENING THE INJUSTICE IN THIS WORLD" EVOKEKS, IN THIS HAITIAN LEADERSHIP, MEMORIES OF A DEFIANT AND BRUISING CONFRONTATION WITH THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION. AT THE SAME TIME, IT ENCOURAGES THE HOPE, AT LEAST AMONG THE REGIME'S INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ADVERSARIES, THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOW BE DISPOSED TO INTERVENE, REPLACE THE "PRESIDENT FOR LIFE," AND BRING ABOUT FREE ELECTIONS. AS OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY HAS BEEN ARTICULATED PUBLICLY, SUCH MISCONCEPTIONS HAVE WANED IN BOTH QUARTERS. NEVER-

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THELESS, WE WILL HAVE TO REMAIN ALERT TO TWO DANGERS: (A) THE THE "DINOSAURS" OF THE REGIME -- THE ARCH-CONSERVATIVE, VIOLENCE-PRONE FACTION -- WILL SEEK TO DISTORT OUR POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY A NATIONALISTIC BACKLASH AND THE RESUMPTION OF REPRESSIVE TACTICS AGAINST SUSPECTED DISSIDENTS; AND (B) THAT CRUSADING HAITIAN JOURNALISTS AND INTELLECTUALS WILL PUSH "BRINKMANSHIP" TOO FAR AND PROVOKE OFFICIAL REPRISALS.

5. THE FIRST DANGER WILL BECOME MORE ACUTE IF THERE SHOULD BE A RECURRENCE OF INCURSIONS OR SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS LAUNCHED AGAINST HAITI BY THE EXILES, WITH OR WITHOUT CUBAN BACKING. OUR INTEREST IN CARIBBEAN REGIONAL STABILITY AND COOPERATION AS A CONDITION FOR HAITI'S DEVELOPMENT SUGGESTS A POLICY OF CAUTIONING ALL FOREIGN ADVENTURERS

AGAINST INTERVENTION.

6. A FINAL POINT: OUR INTERESTS IN HAITI OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE OUTCOME OF THE INTENSIFIED LEADERSHIP CONFLICT WITHIN THE DUVALIER FAMILY. THE PRESIDENT IS REPORTED TO BE BITTERLY AT ODDS WITH HIS STRONG-WILLED, ARCH-CONSERVATIVE MOTHER OVER THE CAUSES AND REMEDIES FOR THE CURRENT POWER, WATER, AND FOOD SHORTAGES. RADICAL CHANGES AT THE PALACE CANNOT BE EXCLUDED, ALTHOUGH NO ALTERNATIVE TO A

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DUVALIERIST POLITICAL FRAMEWORK IS VISIBLE.

7. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, OUR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PARM MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

8. HUMANITARIAN INTEREST IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

(A) WE PROPOSE AN INTENSIFIED EFFORT TO SECURE A CONSENSUS AMONG THE INTERNATIONAL DONORS ON HAITI'S DEVELOPMENTAL NEEDS AND PRIORITIES AND ON THE NEED FOR SYSTEMATIC COORDINATING PROCEDURES. WE WOULD SEEK AGREEMENT FIRST AMONG THE DONORS AND THEN WITH THE HAITIANS THAT WE MUST DEAL URGENTLY AND COHESIVELY WITH THE PROBLEM OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY -- NOT AN ABSOLUTE BUT A RELATIVE CONSTRAINT, SUBJECT TO ALLEVIATION BY PLANNING AND MANAGERIAL METHODS. WHETHER UNDER THE EXISTING OAS JOINT COMMISSION OR, SHOULD THAT PROVE INEFFECTIVE, UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE WORLD BANK WE WOULD ALSO SEEK TO: AVOID OVERLAPPING OR MUTUALLY CONFLICTING PROJECTS; PROVIDE COHERENT SUPPORT FOR HAITIAN FIVE-YEAR PLAN GOALS; GENERATE BETTER PERFORMANCE ON THE PART OF THE HAITIAN DEVELOPMENTAL MINISTRIES; AND MAXIMIZE COLLECTIVE DONOR LEVERAGE IN ORDER TO PROMOTE NECESSARY STRUCTURAL REFORMS, BOTH ADMINISTRATIVE AND FISCAL.

(B) THE U.S. AID PROGRAM, FOCUSED ON DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE WHICH "DIRECTLY BENEFITS" THE NEEDY (SECTION 116 OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT), CONCENTRATES ON RAISING SMALL FARMER INCOME AND IMPROVING LIVING CONDITIONS AMONG THE RURAL MAJORITY. OUR STRATEGY AIMS TO RAISE PRODUCTION OF FOOD AND CERTAIN CASH CROPS AND TO IMPROVE AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES, E.G. THROUGH PROTECTING THE SOIL, USING BETTER SEED, APPLYING INNOVATIVE FOOD PRODUCTION METHODS SUCH AS FISH FARMING, AND MAKING MORE RATIONAL USE OF WATER RESOURCES. (WE ARE DOWNGRADING, AN INAPPROPRIATE TO HAITI'S SMALL-FARM AGRICULTURE, THE INTRODUCTION OF ADVANCED AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY, EXTENSIVE USE OF

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CHEMICALS, AND WIDESPREAD PROVISION OF CREDIT.) WE WILL ALSO ADDRESS APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY (NOVEL ENERGY SOURCES -- SOLAR AND WIND) AND TECHNICAL TRAINING AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL (AS DISTINCT FROM THE EDUCATIONAL SECTOR PROPER WHERE OTHER DONORS ARE ALREADY HEAVILY COMMITTED). WE ENVISAGE A CONTINUING SIGNIFICANT LEVEL OF PL 480 TITLE I AND II PROGRAMS AND A STRONG COMMITMENT TO RURAL HEALTH DELIVERY SERVICES. IN SUM, WE INTEND TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT OUR ASSISTANCE DOES BENEFIT THE NEEDY AND THAT WE CAN PROVE IT.

9. HUMAN RIGHTS INTEREST

(A) TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE MUTUALLY RECOGNIZED IF TACIT LINK BETWEEN THE POST-1971 GOH TREND TO GREATER HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE AND OUR CAPACITY TO MAINTAIN A SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN HAITI, WE SHOULD INTRODUCE AND APPLY THE CONCEPT THAT PERFORMANCE IN HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS IS A LEGITIMATE MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS. OUR LEVERAGE WOULD BE FLEXIBLY APPLIED TO ACKNOWLEDGE PROGRESS AND SIGNAL CONCERN OVER A PATTERN OF VIOLATIONS. ABTRARY CUT-OFF CONCEPTS WOULD BE AVOIDED, AS WOULD THE USE OF SECTION 502(B) AS A SANCTION. DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS IN PORT AU PRINCE AND WASHINGTON AND THE INFLUENCE ON HAITIAN OFFICIALS OF RESPECTED U.S. LEGISLATORS (SENATOR BROOKE, CONGRESSMAN RANGEL) WOULD ADVANCE THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS.

(B) WE SHOULD FOCUS OUR EFFORTS ON VIOLATIONS AGAINST THE PERSON, E.G. IMPROVEMENT OF PRISON CONDITIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY TO FAMILIES FOR PRISONERS' WELFARE, WHEREABOUTS AND THE NATURE OF CHARGES AGAINST THEM, AND THE APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS TO DETAINEES AS PROVIDED UNDER THE HAITIAN CONSTITUTION. WE WOULD INVOKE THE ASSISTANCE OF APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES SUCH AS THE OAS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND THE ICRC AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO TAKE CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS

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IN HAITI.

(C) WE SHOULD IN ADDITION ENCOURAGE THE GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE ITS POLICY OF TOLERANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE AND CON-

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STRUCTIVE MEDIA CRITICISM AND MAKE CLEAR THAT ANY ARRESTS OF LEADING COMMENTATORS OR THE ARBITRARY CLOSURE OF NEWSPAPERS WOULD WEAKEN OUR ABILITY TO DEFEND OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS AND BEFORE THE PUBLIC. WE ENVISAGE CONTINUED EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS WITH SENIOR HAITIAN OFFICIALS, AMBASSADORIAL INTERCESSION AS APPROPRIATE, GREATER USE OF LEADER GRANTS AND THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF VISITS BY THE INTER-AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION.

10. INTEREST IN A STABLE, CONSTRUCTIVE
CARIBBEAN ROLE FOR HAITI

(A) WE SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO DISABUSE HAITIAN EXILE GROUPS (OR OTHER ASPIRING REVOLUTIONARIES) OF ANY NOTION THAT WE WOULD TURN A "BLIND EYE" ON INCURSIONS LAUNCHED AGAINST HAITI. WE SHOULD SEEK TO HAVE THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEUTRALITY ACT MORE VIGOROUSLY APPLIED AGAINST CLANDESTINE EXILE OPERATIONS AGAINST HAITI.

(B) WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE CUBAN AUTHORITIES THAT ANY FINANCIAL OR MILITARY SUPPORT FOR EXILE SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST HAITI WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH CONFIDENTIAL

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THE UNITED STATES.

(C) WE SHOULD MAINTAIN OUR LIMITED MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, FOCUSED ON SEA AND AIR RESCUE, AS

A MEANS TO PROVIDE A HUMANITARIAN SERVICE TO DISTRESSED MARINERS AND TO BUILD COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH THE HAITIAN MILITARY, TRADITIONALLY A KEY ELEMENT IN THE HAITIAN POWER STRUCTURE. IN ADDITION, WE SHOULD EXAMINE WAYS TO BROADEN THE SCOPE OF THAT PROGRAM, WITH CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL, TO INCLUDE CIVIC ACTION MEASURES AND THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF STAFF OFFICERS, WHILE CONTINUING TO AVOID ANY FORM OF ASSISTANCE WHICH MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS SUPPORTING COUNTER-INSURGENCY OR EMIGRATION CONTROL OPERATIONS.

(D) WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE RECENT TREND TOWARD CLOSER HAITIAN-DOMINICAN COOPERATION IN MATTERS OF INTERNAL SECURITY, TRADE, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SEEKING TO REDUCE MUTUAL SUSPICIONS AND STRENGTHEN THE SENSE OF SOLIDARITY AND THE CAPACITY FOR A BALANCED POOLING OF RESOURCES BETWEEN THE TWO NEIGHBORING STATES ON HISPANIOLA.

C. OBJECTIVES

1. TO FIND MEANS OF MAINTAINING AND STRENGTHENING RECENT TRENDS IN HAITI TOWARD A MORE OPEN, COMPASSIONATE, DEVELOPMENT-ORIENTED AND POLITICALLY STABLE GOVERNMENT.

2. TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF HAITIAN DEVELOPMENT. THE GOH WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO ADVANCE THE RIGHTS OF ITS PEOPLE GENERALLY IN ITS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND SPECIFICALLY IN ASSURING THE SECURITY OF THE PERSON AND THE FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA TO UNDERTAKE RESPONSIBLE CRITICISM.

3. TO ASSIST THE POOREST AND MOST NEEDY HAITIANS
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THROUGH SUCH HUMANITARIAN/DEVELOPMENT TOOLS AS PL 480 TITLE II IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF DROUGHT, MAL-NUTRITION AND GOVERNMENT INEPTITUDE.

4. TO ENCOURAGE THE GOH TO MOVE DELIBERATELY THROUGH THE PRE-DEVELOPMENT STAGE. A MUCH GREATER, TANGIBLE, AND BETTER ORGANIZED GOH COMMITMENT TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE KEY SECTORS OF THE COUNTRY WILL HAVE TO BE OBTAINED, WORKING IN CLOSELY COORDINATED FASHION WITH INTERNATIONAL DONORS.

5. TO SEEK WAYS IN CONJUNCTION WITH OBJECTIVES THREE AND FOUR ABOVE TO REDUCE THE PRESSURES FOR ILLEGAL EMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO DEVELOP EFFECTIVE WAYS OF MONITORING HAITIAN DEPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES.

6. TO PERSUADE THE GOH TO RECOGNIZE THE MAJOR CONTRI-

BUTION THAT THE PRIVATE SECTOR CAN MAKE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND TO GET IT TO TAKE STEPS PROMOTING GREATER FOREIGN AND LOCAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT.

7. TO ENCOURAGE TRENDS IN GOH ARMED FORCES SUPPORTIVE OF CLOSE IDENTIFICATION WITH THE UNITED STATES, OF GREATER PROFESSIONALISM AND MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT. TO HELP BUILD UP ITS SEA/AIR RESCUE CAPABILITY.

8. TO ASSIST THE GOH IN UNDERSTANDING THE REASONS FOR UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CUBA ON A MEASURED AND RECIPROCAL BASIS. THE GOH SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED FROM TAKING AN EXTREME POSITION ON THIS ISSUE OR REQUESTING GREATER U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR REASONS RELATED TO CUBA.

D. ISSUES

1. HUMAN RIGHTS (OBJECTIVE 2)

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(A) DISCUSSION

SINCE 1971 THE GOH HAS MADE APPRECIABLE PROGRESS IN REDUCING THE SCALE AND INTENSITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WHICH BROUGHT OPPROBRIUM ON THE FRANCOIS DUVALIER REGIME. SOME 650 PRISONERS (POLITICAL AS WELL AS COMMON LAW) HAVE BEEN RELEASED, ARBITRARY TERROR AGAINST THE MULATTO CLASS HAS BEEN ELIMINATED, AND PRISON CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN IMPROVED TO SOME EXTENT (E.G. THE ANTIQUATED FORT DIMANCHE CELLS HAVE BEEN DEMOLISHED AND ARE BEING REPLACED BY A MODERN FACILITY).

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THE GOVERNMENT HAS PROCEEDED CAUTIOUSLY IN THESE REFORMS, ANXIOUS TO PRESERVE DUVALIER PERE'S REPUTATION AND OBSESSED WITH THE DANGER THAT PRO-COMMUNIST RADICALISM MIGHT GAIN GROUND AND ASSUME AN OPERATIONAL CAPACITY, WITH OUTSIDE HELP. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOH UNDERSTANDS THAT THE RESUMPTION OF U.S. AID PROGRAMS IN 1972 WAS PREDICATED ON AN INTENTION TO REDUCE REPRESSION, AND ITS PRISONER RELEASES HAVE BEEN MADE WITH AN EYE TO MAKING A FAVORABLE IMPACT ON U.S. CRITICS OF THE REGIME.

OBTAINING REDUCTIONS IN THE MOST SERIOUS ABUSES AGAINST BOTH POLITICAL AND COMMON LAW PRISONERS STILL BEING CONTINUED -- PROLONGED DETENTION WITHOUT CHARGES OR TRIAL, DEMORALIZING PRISON CONDITIONS -- WILL BE DIFFICULT. THE MILITARY PRISON ADMINISTRATORS AND THE SECURITY SERVICES APPEAR IMMUNE FROM JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND HAVE THUS FAR FELT NO REAL PRESSURE FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. RESENTMENT OF ANY U.S. "INTERVENTIONISM" CONTINUES TO BE A SENTIMENT COMMON TO MANY HAITIAN OFFICIALS.

(B) COURSES OF ACTION

(1) WE SHOULD (AS THE ARA STRATEGY PAPER ON HAITI PROPOSES) FOCUS OUR EFFORTS PRIMARILY ON THE MOST SERIOUS
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GROSS VIOLATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST THE PERSON, SPECIFICALLY SEEKING GOH ACTION TO: REFORM PRISON ADMINISTRATION TO ENSURE REASONABLE STANDARDS OF NUTRITION, HYGIENE, AND MEDICAL CARE AND SAFEGUARDS AGAINST BRUTAL TREATMENT;

PERMIT THE IMPARTIAL INSPECTION OF PRISON CONDITIONS AND PRISONER TREATMENT BY OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS (E.G. THE ICRC, THE PAPAL NUCIO ASSIGNED TO PORT AU PRINCE); ENSURE THAT ALL PRISONERS -- EVEN THOSE WHO FALL UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS -- HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM AND TO HAVE A TRIAL, AS PROVIDED IN HAITI'S CONSTITUTION; ACCOUNT FOR PRISONERS, ALIVE OR DECEASED, IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FROM THEIR FAMILIES.

(2) AS THE ARA PAPER SUGGESTS, WE MAY BE ABLE TO INDUCE PROGRESS IN THESE FOUR AREAS BY HOLDING OUT CONTINUED

COOPERATION IN MUTUAL SECURITY (PROBABLY OF SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE TO THE GOH DESPITE WHAT FROM THEIR VIEWPOINT IS ITS NARROW FOCUS ON AIR/SEA RESCUE), ASSURANCES THAT WE WILL INFORM CONGRESS OF SPECIFIC IMPROVEMENTS MADE IN HAITI, AND SYMBOLIC GESTURES OF FRIENDSHIP (ALTHOUGH VISITS BY DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS MUST BE VERY CAREFULLY HANDLED TO AVOID AROUSING UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS).

(3) NEVERTHELESS, WE SHOULD CONSIDER OUR OPTIONS
SHOULD SUCH LEVERS -- AND A MORE RATIONAL GOH SENSE OF
SELF-INTEREST -- FAIL TO INDUCE MOVEMENT. USING OUR
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WOULD POSE A SERIOUS QUESTION:
COULD WE MANAGE ELEMENTS OF THIS PROGRAM FLEXIBLY ENOUGH
SO AS TO PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS
PERFORMANCE WITHOUT REACHING THE POINT WHERE, IF WE
FAILED, WE WOULD HAVE TO CUT OFF AID AND HARM THE
PEASANT FAMILIES WHO MOST NEED OUR HELP?

(4) OUR PROVISIONAL ANSWER -- CONTRARY
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TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARA PAPER -- IS AFFIRMATIVE.
WE NOTE THAT AMONG THE CONSIDERATIONS THE PRESIDENT
MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHEN FURNISHING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
IS "THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE RECIPIENT COUNTRY IS MAKING
PROGRESS TOWARD RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW, FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION AND OF THE PRESS...." (SECTION 211 (A)
(7), FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT). WE ALSO NOTE THAT IN HAITI
TITLE I CONCESSIONALLY FINANCED SALES HAVE ESCALATED
DRAMATICALLY AND ARE NOW IN THE \$11-12 MILLION RANGE. THE
RESULTING COUNTERPART FUNDS (AS DISTINCT FROM TITLE II) ARE
NOT EARMARKED FOR EXCLUSIVELY HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES BUT ARE
TO BE USED TO SUPPORT SELF-HELP EFFORTS (AS DESCRIBED IN
SECTION 208). THE MAJOR GOH DEVELOPMENT MINISTRIES AND THE
BNRH HAVE DEVELOPED A STRONG STAKE IN THE CONTINUED FLOW OF
THESE TITLE I COUNTERPART FUNDS.

(5) WE PROPOSE THAT IF NO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IS
MADE OVER A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME ON THE FOUR CATEGORIES OF
ABUSES AGAINST THE PERSON CITED ABOVE, THE EMBASSY BE AUTHORIZED
TO ESTABLISH A CLEAR LINKAGE BETWEEN THE AVAILABILITY OF TITLE
I COMMODITIES AND GOH PERFORMANCE IN THESE AREAS. OUR REPRESENTATIONS
WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE -- STRESSING THAT EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS WILL BE
ACKNOWLEDGED PROMPTLY AND APPROPRIATELY -- BUT WE SHOULD LEAVE THE
GOH IN NO DOUBT THAT THEIR CONTINUED UNRESPONSIVENESS ON THIS
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE WOULD HAVE DIRECT AND PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES
IN TERMS OF TITLE I PROGRAMMING.

(6) UNDER THE SELF-HELP CRITERIA, WE SHOULD EXAMINE
THE POSSIBILITY OF USING TITL I FUNDS TO SUPPORT GOH

EFFORTS TO MAKE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS, E.G. IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF RURAL JUSTICE AND IN LAND TENURE ARRANGE-
MENTS (SECTION 208 (F) AND (G)).

(7) WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE TREND TOWARD GREATER
GOVERNMENT TOLERANCE OF RESPONSIBLE PRESS CRITICISM AND
EXPRESSION OF OPINION BY MAKING AVAILABLE LEADER GRANTS
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TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEDIA. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE
INTER-AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION TO STRENGTHEN ITS CONTACTS
WITH HAITIAN JOURNALISTS BY MEANS OF VISITS AND CONSULTATIONS.

(8) WE SHOULD URGE THE GOH TO DEVELOP A MORE
EFFECTIVE INFORMATION PROGRAM DESIGNED TO CLARIFY AND
EXPLAIN GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES BEARING ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, BROADLY CONCEIVED. A CONCEPT OF IMPROVING
THE QUALITY OF HAITIAN JUSTICE IN THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL,
AND ECONOMIC FIELDS MIGHT MAKE SUCH A PROGRAM MORE ATTRACTIVE
TO THE HAITIAN AUTHORITIES THAN WOULD BE THE CASE IF THEY FELT
OBLIGED TO DEFEND THE RECORD UNDER A NARROWER HUMAN RIGHTS
DEFINITION.

(9) WE SHOULD INTENSIFY THE DIALOGUE WITH THE
GOH ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ACKNOWLEDGING
PROGRESS SYSTEMATICALLY AND EXPRESSING OUR CONCERN OVER
ANY LAPSES FROM THE RECENT PATTERN OF IMPROVEMENTS. WE

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SHOULD SEEK CLEAR GOH UNDERSTANDING FOR THE CONCEPT THAT ABUSES OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS INCLUDE THOSE CAUSED BY POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INJUSTICE, AND THAT THE UNITED STATES AND HAITI HAVE PARALLEL INTERESTS IN ADVANCING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE HAITIAN PEOPLE THROUGH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. PERFORMANCE IN REDUCING POLITICAL INJUSTICE IS AS RELEVANT A CRITERION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS IS PERFORMANCE IN REDUCING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INJUSTICE. IN THE LONG RUN, NONE OF THESE THREE AREAS CAN BE CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION, AND PROGRESS IN ANY ONE OF THE THREE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS IN THE OTHERS.

2. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (OBJECTIVE 4)

(A) DISCUSSION

THE UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE EFFORT STARTED OFF CAUTIOUSLY IN 1972 BUT HAD INCREASED MARKEDLY BY 1976 (TO \$30 MILLION) AT THE SAME TIME THAT OTHER DONOR ASSISTANCE WAS GROWING. ALL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (U.S. AND OTHER DONORS) HAVE NOW BEGUN TO ENCOUNTER SERIOUS PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION AND EXECUTION CAUSED IN PART BY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DONORS AND THE GOVERNMENT OVER PRIORITIES, PROCEDURES, PERFORMANCE AND RESPONSIBILITIES,

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BUT MOSTLY AS A RESULT OF LIMITS ON THE CAPACITY OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE ECONOMY AND THE SOCIETY TO ACCEPT MUCH MORE HELP.

INTERNATIONAL DONOR REPRESENTATIVES IN HAITI NOW GENERALLY AGREE THAT ASSISTANCE IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TOO FAST AND THAT THIS HAS INTENSIFIED THE COUNTRY'S ABSORPTIVE PROBLEMS, WITH CONSEQUENT DECLINE IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ALL PROGRAMS AND POTENTIAL WASTE OF SCARCE EXTERNAL RESOURCES. THEY ALSO AGREE THAT THE CAPACITY TO ABSORB ASSISTANCE IS LIMITED MAINLY BY THE LACK OF TRAINED MANPOWER AND BY THE INADEQUACY OF DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES. INFRASTRUCTURE IS OBVIOUSLY LACKING, BUT IT IS GRADUALLY BEING DEVELOPED AND IS NOT YET AN IMPORTANT OBSTACLE TO THE USE OF ASSISTANCE RESOURCES. THE GOVERNMENT'S FISCAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES DEFINITELY NEED REFORM, PARTICULARLY IF FINANCIAL COUNTERPART RESOURCES AND DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS ARE TO BE FINANCED IN THE FUTURE. ALTHOUGH THIS WILL BE A PROGRAMMING CONSIDERATION OF ALL DONORS IN THEIR DEALINGS IN HAITI, THE MAJOR CONSTRAINT TO EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT IS ONLY SECONDARILY FINANCIAL; IT

IS PRIMARILY HUMAN AND INSTITUTIONAL.

FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOH STILL DOES NOT HAVE A REALISTIC GRASP OF THE DEMANDS THAT INCREASING ASSISTANCE LEVELS PLACE ON THEIR HUMAN, INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES, OR OF THE NEED TO EXPAND THEIR LIMITED ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY BY SUCH MEASURES AS TRAINING, RECRUITING FROM ABROAD, RAISING SALARIES SYSTEMATICALLY, CREATING EFFECTIVE LOCAL INSTITUTIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS, ETC. THE GOH FIVE YEAR PLAN OF 1976 IS A CREDITABLE ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH AN ORDER OF PRIORITIES, BUT IT HAS NOT BEEN BACKED UP BY ANALYSIS, TRANSLATED INTO BUDGETARY TERMS, OR ANTICULATED IN OPERATIONAL TERMS BY THE GOH TO ITS OWN MINISTERS OR TO FOREIGN DONORS. MOREOVER,

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THE GOH HAS MOVED VERY SLOWLY TO FISCALIZE ITS EXTRA-BUDGETARY ACCOUNTS TO FINANCE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (ALTHOUGH A FEBRUARY 9 DECREE PROVIDES THAT 50 PERCENT OF REGIE DU TABAC RECEIPTS SHALL BE PLACED IN A SPECIAL ACCOUNT) AND HAS MADE NO CONCERTED EFFORT TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL RESOURCES THROUGH THE PRIVATE INVESTMENT SECTOR (FOREIGN AND HAITIAN).

DONOR AGENCIES HAVE TENDED TO STRUCTURE THEIR OWN PRIORITIES, PICK THEIR OWN FAVORITE REGIONS FOR GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS, AND IMPLEMENT PROJECTS ON A LARGEY BILATERAL BASIS THROUGH THE RESPECTIVE MINISTRIES. THEIR PRIORITIES HAVE NOT NECESSARILY DEVIATED FROM THE GOH'S GENERAL GUIDELINES, BUT THEY ARE NOT PRECISELY RELATED TO A SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED AND CAREFULLY WORKED OUT DEVELOPMENT PLAN. THEY HAVE IN ADDITION NOT INSISTED ADEQUATELY ON OVERALL DEVELOPMENTAL PERFORMANCE, CONCERNING THEMSELVES UNTIL RECENTLY WITH THEIR OWN INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS. IN THEIR DESIRE TO HELP HAITI, THE DONORS MAY HAVE CREATED THE ILLUSION OF UNENDING FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR WHICH PERFORMANCE QUID PRO QUO WILL NOT BE DEMANDED. TO IMPROVE DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS FOR HAITI, WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING STEPS.

(B) COURSES OF ACTION

(1) THE UNITED STATES BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT GRANT PROGRAM IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH DEFINED DEVELOPMENT GOALS MUST PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS ON EXPANSION OF THE HAITIAN ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY THROUGH INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, TRAINING OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN PROJECT EXECUTION, INSTITUTION BUILDING, AND MANAGEMENT REFORM AND IMPROVEMENT. IT MUST BE CLEARLY ACCEPTED THAT PROJECTS DESIGNED FOR HAITI ARE GOING TO TAKE MORE TIME TO EXECUTE, MORE FLEXIBILITY IN MANAGEMENT APPROACHES AND MORE PATIENCE IN EXPECTING DRAMATIC RESULTS. TO SUPPORT THESE GOALS:

(I) USAID/H WILL NEED FOR PRODUCE FULLER
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SECTORAL ANALYSES, ESPECIALLY OF THE AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SECTORS; MORE DETAILED DESCRIPTION IN PROJECT DOCUMENTATION OF PLANS FOR MANPOWER AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT ESSENTIAL TO PROJECT EXECUTION; MORE COMPLETE PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING; STRENGTHENING OF LOCAL MANAGEMENT BY EXCEPTION TECHNIQUES.

(II) AID/W WILL NEED TO SUPPORT OUR ANALYSTICAL STUDIES, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, AND PROBLEMS IN PROJECT DESIGN (INCLUDING THE NEED FOR PROJECT ELEMENTS

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NSC-05 TRSE-00 USIA-06 /084 W
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SUCH AS PROVISION OF BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE WHICH MIGHT NOT BE APPROPRIATE IN A MORE DEVELOPED CONTEXT).

(2) U.S. BILATERAL GRANT ASSISTNCE
PROJECTIONS HAVE BEEN MADE AT ROUGHLY THE \$20 MILLION LEVEL THROUGH FY 1981, BUT GENERAL PROGRAM LEVELS AND SPECIFIC PROJECT APPROVALS BEYOND FY 1978 SHOULD BE MADE DEPENDENT ON A CAREFUL AND PRECISE ASSESSMENT OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE GOH AND THE DONORS CAN TOGETHER RESOLVE THE ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY AND PERFORMANCE ISSUES CITED ABOVE.

(3) WE SHOULD EXAMINE HOW THE PVOS CAN SERVE TO A GREATER EXTENT AS INSTRUMENTS FOR BRINGING SERVICES TO THE RURAL SECTOR AND STIMULATING LOCAL INITIATIVES FOR DEVELOPMENT, THUS BYPASSING A PART OF THE ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY PROBLEM.

(4) BECAUSE THE PROBLEM OF HAITI'S ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY CANNOT BE SOLVED BY THE U.S. ALONE, THE UNITED STATES, AT THE WASHINGTON AGENCY LEVEL, SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN CREATING AMONG DONORS, AND BETWEEN DONORS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI, A FULLER APPRECIATION OF WHAT THE PROBLEM AS DEFINED ABOVE DEMANDS OF ALL DONORS IN TERMS
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OF COORDINATION OF PLANNING, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, PROJECT DESIGN AND PROJECT EXECUTION.

(5) IN CONCERT WITH OTHER DONORS, WE SHOULD SEEK A MORE REALISTIC GOH APPRECIATION OF THE LIMITS ON ACCEPTING EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE AND THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITIES FOR AVOIDING WASTAGE OF EXTERNALLY PROVIDED RESOURCES.

(6) THE U.S. SHOULD ALSO SEEK AGREEMENT AMONG ALL DONORS THAT, AS A PRE-REQUISITE FOR CONTINUED LONG-TERM ASSISTANCE, THE GOH SHOULD TAKE ADEQUATE SELF-HELP MEASURES AND IMPROVE ITS PERFORMANCE, E.G. IN BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS TO DEVELOPMENTAL MINISTRIES, USE OF EXTRA BUDGETARY ACCOUNTS, COUNTERPART FUNDS, AND THE FLOW OF RESOURCES TO THE RURAL SECTOR GENERALLY.

(7) THE OAS JOINT COMMISSION MEETING IN WASHINGTON IN JUNE, AND THE DISCUSSIONS LEADING UP TO IT, PROVIDE AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF ITEMS 4, 5, 6.

(8) DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF THE DISCUSSIONS WITH GOH AT THE JUNE MEETING AND ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF ITS RESPONSE TO OUR CONCERNs, AS JUDGED BY PRACTICAL RESULTS DURING A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME THEREAFTER, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ASKING THE IBRD TO TAKE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CREATING A MORE EFFECTIVE COORDINATING BODY TO STRENGTHEN OR REPLACE THE JOINT COMMISSION MECHANISM.

3. SECURITY ASSISTANCE (OBJECTIVE 7)

(A) DISCUSSION

HAITI'S SMALL MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE

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PROGRAM IS UNIQUE IN THE HEMISPHERE IN THAT IT:

-- IS LIMITED, BY AGREEMENT WITH CONGRESS, TO
A CAREFULLY DESIGNED SEA/AIR RESCUE CAPACITY

-- HAS NO INTERNAL SECURITY OR MILITARY RELEVANCE

-- WILL HELP THE GOH ASSUME MARINE SAFETY
RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH THE U.S. COAST GUARD HAS
HITHERTO HAD TO UNDERTAKE

-- IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE GRADUAL NORMALIZATION OF
US/GOH BILATERAL RELATIONS IN RECENT YEARS AND
WITH U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF HAITI AS NO LONGER A
"PARIAH" AMONG LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

MOREOVER, BECAUSE OF THE SYMBOLIC VALUE ATTACHED TO THE
PROGRAM, IT PROVIDES US WITH LEVERAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS,
UNDER SECTION 502 (B), WHICH WE MIGHT NOT HAVE ELSEWHERE.

FINALLY, THE PROGRAM ENHANCES OUR ACCESS TO, AND
INFLUENCE OVER, THE HAITIAN ARMED FORCES, TRADITIONALLY A KEY
ELEMENT IN THE POWER STRUCTURE OF THIS AUTHORITARIAN COUNTRY.

NEVERTHELESS, GROWING CONGRESSIONAL DISSATISFACTION
WITH SECURITY ASSISTANCE GENERALLY MAY EXPOSE THE PROGRAM FOR
HAITI TO RENEWED SCRUTINY.

IF THE PROGRAM WERE TO BE ELIMINATED IN THE CONTEXT
OF GENERAL REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE HEMISPHERE,
THE GOH WOULD BE DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED AND WOULD INTERPRET
THE ACTION AS UNWARRANTED IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR
EFFORTS TO COOPERATE ON MUTUAL SECURITY MATTERS AND ON
MULTILATERAL ISSUES.

(B) COURSES OF ACTION

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(1) WORK CLOSELY WITH THE GOH TO ENSURE THAT
THE PROGRAM IS CARRIED OUT PROFESSIONALLY AND WHOLLY IN
KEEPING WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF ITS MARINE SAFETY
OBJECTIVES.

(2) TAKE STEPS TO PROVIDE CONGRESS WITH EVIDENCE
THAT ATTENUATION OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN HAITI HAS BEEN
PROMOTED BY THE INSTITUTION OF THE PROGRAM, AND TO REASSURE
IT THAT NO COASTAL CRAFT CAPACITY HAS BEEN PROVIDED WHICH
MIGHT BE USED FOR ILLEGAL REFUGEE CONTROL.

(3) EXPLORE CONGRESSIONAL RECEPΤIVITY TO USING
IMET AND FMS FUNDS TO ENHANCE THE PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
OF KEY OFFICERS, E.G. RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND TO SUPPORT
A CIVIC ACTION CAPABILITY IN THE ARMED FORCES (E.G. ENGINEER
CORPS) WHICH IN TURN WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
EFFORTS.

4. CUBA (OBJECTIVE 8)

(A) DISCUSSION

THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND CUBA WAS NOT UNEXPECTED HERE, BUT HAS INEVITABLY

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CAUSED MISGIVINGS. CUBA, ON 47 MILES FROM HAITI,
IS ENERGETICALLY EXPANDING ITS INFLUENCE IN THE
CARIBBEAN, USING NON-PROVOCATIVE METHODS (E.G.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) BUT BY NO MEANS RELINQUISHING
THE USE OF SUBVERSIVE METHODS. THE HAITIANS WORRY
THAT CUBAN TROUBLEMAKING WILL NOT DECLINE UNDER AN
IMPROVED US/CUBAN RELATIONSHIP.

THE GOH IS AWARE OF CLANDESTINE CUBAN ENCOURAGEMENT

FOR HAITIAN EXILES CONTEMPLATING ACTION AGAINST THE REGIME.
THE GOH IS PRONE TO RECURRENT "JITTERS" ABOUT SUCH PLOTS
AND IN 1976 EXPRESSED THE FEAR THAT HAITIAN ARMED FORCES
WOULD BE UNABLE TO CONTAIN A CUBAN INCURSION BEFORE THE
U.S. OR RIO ALLIES COULD SWING INTO ACTION. SUCH AN
IRRATIONAL APPREHENSIVE MOOD COULD SPUR A RASH OF ARRESTS
OF SUSPECTED SUBVERSIVES AND A DRIVE TO BUY EXCESSIVE
QUANTITIES OF ARMS, WITH ADVERSE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES.

(B) COURSES OF ACTION

(1) INFORM THE GOH, AS APPROPRIATE, THAT: THE
RIO TREATY REMAINS AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT AGAINST CUBAN
AGGRESSION; CONTINGENCY PLANS AGAINST CUBAN AGGRESSION
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ROUTINELY DEVELOPED BY THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD
APPEAR ADEQUATE; FOLLOW-ON VISITS OF SENIOR U.S. COMMANDERS
(SOUTHCOM, COMNAVFORCARIB) MIGHT BE ARRANGED IN THE NEXT
YEAR OR TWO TO SUPPLEMENT THOSE WHICH TOOK PLACE
IN 1976; AND WE WILL PROVIDE THE GOH WITH SIGNIFICANT
INFORMATION BEARING ON CUBAN POLITICO-MILITARY INTENTIONS
IN THE REGION, WHETHER DERIVED FROM THE U.S./CUBAN TALKS
OR OTHERWISE.

(2) RAISE WITH THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT THE
QUESTION OF APPLYING THE NEUTRALITY ACT MORE CONSISTENTLY
AND PURPOSEFULLY AGAINST HAITIAN EXILES IN THE UNITED STATES
WHO ARE ACTIVELY PLOTTING AGAINST THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT.

(3) ENSURE THE ADEQUACY OF INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING
EFFORTS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF HAITIAN EXILES, PARTICULARLY
TO OBTAIN SUFFICIENT ADVANCE WARNING OF ANY PLANNED SUB-
VERSIVE OPERATONS.

(4) TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO DISABUSE HAITIAN
EXILE GROUPS -- WHETHER BACKED BY THE CUBANS OR NOT -- OF
ANY NOTION THAT WE WOULD TURN A BLIND EYE ON INCURSIONS
LAUNCHED AGAINST HAITI.

(5) INFORM THE CUBAN AUTHORITIES, AT AN APPROPRIATE
TIME, THAT ANY CUBAN FINANCIAL OR MILITARY SUPPORT FOR EXILE
INCURSIONS AGAINST HAITI (OR, FOR THAT MATTER, OTHER INDE-
PENDENT CARIBBEAN STATES) WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH A NEW
U.S./GOC RELATIONSHIP AND WOULD CAUSE US TO RE-EXAMINE THAT
RELATIONSHIP.

(6) ENCOURAGE HAITIAN-COMINCAN CONSULTATIONS AND
COLLABORATION ON MUTUAL SECURITY MATTERS, WITH A VIEW TO

STRENGTHENING THEIR JOINT CAPACITY TO RESIST
CUBAN SUBERSION AND PROMOTE EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

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